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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the use of partnerships as an effective tool for preserving 
capital gains on real estate investments.  For tax purposes, the Internal Revenue Service 
generally treats a limited liability company as a partnership.  This form of organization is 
widely used for real estate investments, and by taking a few simple precautions an LLC 
may ensure that any gain on its investments in undeveloped real property will be treated 
as capital gains.  Such treatment may reduce the LLC’s tax costs substantially.   
 The Fifth Circuit developed a framework that has proven invaluable for analyzing 
the activity of the LLC to determine whether it will be afforded capital gains status.  This 
paper spends a considerable amount of time analyzing that framework as well as 
exploring examples of how the courts have applied this framework.  Additionally, this 
paper discusses choice of entity concerns for investors and briefly analyzes the life cycle 
of a typical real estate investment partnership.   
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1I.   Introduction to the Real Estate Investment Partnership 
 For many years, real estate investors who opt to pool their assets have chosen to 
organize as partnerships.  There are a number of advantages to pooled investments; 
principal among them are the reduction of risk and the ability to obtain financial leverage.  
There are, of course, disadvantages to this form of investment as well.  After all, it is not 
an easy task to find partners whom one can trust with one’s financial well-being, can bear 
to work with, and have the technical know-how to partake in such an investment.  
 This is perhaps one reason why the use of real estate investment partnerships is 
often limited to professionals such as real estate brokers, developers, and professional 
investors.  Such professionals all bear some risk that the I.R.S. will consider them to be in 
the trade or business of selling or developing real estate.  This is where the partnership 
entity may prove useful.  The partnership allows the professional some ability to step 
away from the transaction and separate his real estate investments from property held as 
inventory, or held for sale in the ordinary course of business. 
 While neither the I.R.S. nor the courts are so kind as to provide any bright-line 
test for differentiating between property held for investment and property held in the 
ordinary course of business, the Fifth Circuit has set forth a framework that is useful for 
constructing partnerships that the I.R.S. will respect.  This framework will be discussed 
later in this paper, as will other important issues such as the financing and liquidation of 
these partnerships, but first one must consider why it is best to organize as a partnership.   
 
2II. Choice of Entity Concerns 
 At its base, the choice of entity is a simple question – what legal form should one 
use for an investment in realty?  In reality, choice of entity represents a complex web of 
decisions related to tax, liability, ownership and control issues.  The wrong choice can 
cost investors dearly, and given that the law is not an exact science, clients often leave the 
balancing of relative costs and benefits to their attorney.  Thus, the choice of entity is one 
of the first questions considered in real estate investment, and so this section begins 
analyzing the investor’s options by starting with the simplest of entities, the individual. 
 
A. The Individual  
 Individual ownership of an investment in real estate is, of course, the simplest 
option: the start-up expenses are minimal, there is a single set of books, a single tax, and 
no arguments arise over control or when and whether to sell.  This freedom does, 
however, come at a cost.  First, this form of ownership is not feasible for a dealer in real 
estate who wishes to maintain the capital nature of his investment in the property.1
Second, the individual’s aversion to liability is an important factor.  When the issue of 
liability arises the first thing that comes to mind is the potential for loss related to tortious 
 
1 It is difficult for an individual to segregate real estate held for investment purposes from that held for 
sale.  In some instances, the IRS will seek to attack one’s status as a dealer or independent investor where 
the individual has substantial dealings in real estate.  See Adam v. Comm’r, 60 T.C. 996 (1973) (holding 
that an accountant who purchased 11, and sold 9, parcels of undeveloped land in 4 years was not a dealer); 
Cary v. Comm’r, 32 TCM 913 (1973) (participation of a real estate dealer in a land venture does not, in 
itself, vitiate the investment purpose of an undertaking – an individual may occupy a dual role, but careful 
planning is necessary to segregate investments).  
3conduct.  While this is important, the individual owner must also consider the possibility 
that he will be personally liable for the mortgage.2
In many respects, individual ownership of investment property is closely related 
to common law forms of joint ownership such as tenants in common and joint tenancy.3
Generally, when investors own property as tenants in common, they each hold an 
undivided fractional interest in the property.  Since this interest is undivided, each tenant 
has an equal right to use of the whole property.  Clearly, this can give rise to dispute 
when the parties have differing opinions as to the best use of the property.4
This form of ownership is complicated further by the fact that a tenant in common 
may deduct only that portion of the expenses attributable to his interest in the property, 
even though he may pay more than his share.5 Other unfavorable aspects of the joint 
tenancy form of ownership include its lack of protection against personal liability and its 
potential for unexpected treatment as a partnership.6 Treatment as a partnership, when 
unexpected, may dramatically change the tax treatment of certain transactions.  For 
 
2 A non-recourse mortgage may limit this risk, but these are often difficult for an individual to obtain 
unless they can guarantee substantial equity in the property; cash down payments of 25-30% are not 
uncommon.   
 3 Note that this discussion does not consider tenants by the entirety as a form of investment ownership 
since it only applies to a husband and wife in the majority of jurisdictions.  Furthermore, while the forms of 
ownership in this section might more closely resemble a partnership than individual ownership, I have 
chosen to address them here since the partnership section will contemplate other entities such as the LLC. 
 4 See Spiller v. Mackereth, 334 So. 2d 859 (Ala. 1976) (holding that tenants in common each have an 
equal right to occupy; and unless the one in actual possession denies to the other the right to enter, or agrees 
to pay rent, nothing can be claimed for such occupation).  
 5 Boyd’s Estate v. Comm’r, 28 T.C. 564 (1957) (holding that owner of a 50% interest in income 
producing realty could only deduct his share of expenses since he is entitled to reimbursement from the co-
owner of the property for any payments in excess of his share). 
 6 See Powell v. Comm’r, 26 T.C.M. 161 (1967) (holding that co-owners did not constitute a 
partnership).  I.R.C. § 761 provides the statutory definition of a “partnership” and also allows the partners 
to elect to avoid the application of Subchapter K if certain conditions are met.  The resultant entity is very 
similar to one where individuals own property as joint tenants.  The § 761 election is considered in more 
detail later in this paper.     
4example, in Demirjian v. Commissioner7 the parties were, or at least should have been, 
aware that they were engaged in business as a partnership when they attempted to replace 
condemned property in accordance with § 1033.  This section provides an election 
whereby the taxpayer may opt to replace property subject to involuntary condemnation 
proceedings with similar property.  When read together with § 703 however, § 1033 
“requires that election for nonrecognition of gain on involuntary conversion of 
partnership property...be made by [the] partnership; replacement by individual partners of 
property owned by partnership does not qualify for nonrecognition.”8
This is just one of the many pitfalls that await the unwary user of a tenancy in 
common for real estate investments.  Generally, the risks and benefits of using joint 
tenancy for real estate investment parallel those of the tenants in common.9 The principal 
difference between the two forms of ownership is that if a joint tenant pays expenses 
associated with the property, those expenses are properly deductible only by the tenant 
who pays them.10 
7 457 F.2d 1 (1972).  It is also interesting that the husband and wife trading and Kin-Bro Real Estate 
Company were treated as a partnership despite their arguments to the contrary and their failure to execute a 
formal partnership agreement.  This fact underlies an important aspect of partnership law; namely, that a 
partnership may exist when “tenants in common...actively carry on a trade, business, financial operation, or 
venture and divide the profits thereof.”  Id. at 4-5.   
 8 26 U.S.C.S. § 1033, Note 23.  Demirjian, 457 F.2d at 5-6.  But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8041061 (Jul. 17, 
1980) (permitting a partnership to terminate and distribute land to the partners as tenants in common so that 
the individual partners could take the § 1033 election).   
 9 An interest held by joint tenancy is freely alienable, just as an interest held by a tenant in common, but 
when the joint tenant disposes of his interest the tenancy is broken and the purchaser of the interest 
becomes a tenant in common with the other tenants.  A joint tenant, like a tenant in common, must also 
report his respective share of income and loss associated with the property.  See Haynes v. Comm’r, 7 
B.T.A. 465 (1927).   
 10 See Rev. Rul. 71-179, 1971-1 C.B. 58 (1971).   
5B. The Corporation 
 The use of a C-Corporation for real estate investment presents a host of tax related 
problems that are difficult to escape.  That is exactly why the C-Corp is seldom used for 
such investments, and after a short discussion of the C-Corp, this section will concentrate 
primarily on the potential benefits and disadvantages of the S-Corporation.  The 
paramount problem associated with the C-Corp is double taxation.  When the corporation 
has income, it pays taxes on this income at rates as high as 35%,11 and when the 
corporation distributes this income to shareholders those shareholders again pay tax on 
the dividend distributions.12 Other significant problems include the potential for an 
accumulated earnings tax13 and classification as a personal holding company.14 
For these reasons, and others, investors are more likely to choose to organize as 
an S-Corp than a C-Corp.  The S-Corp combines prominent features of both the C-Corp 
and the common partnership.  Most importantly, the S-Corp provides the limited liability 
benefits of a corporation while permitting pass-through treatment of income, just like a 
partnership.15 Notwithstanding these benefits, there are down sides to the S-Corp, so it is 
not necessarily the best option for real estate investment activity.  
 
11 Corporate income tax rates are strategically scaled from 15% to 39% such that corporations in the 
highest tax bracket, those earning over $18,333,333 per year, pay an average, and marginal, rate of 35%.  
See I.R.C. § 11(a).   
 12 Depending on the circumstances, the dividend income may be taxed at either ordinary income rates 
(up to 35%) or at special rates for qualified dividend income.  See I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(B).   
 13 See I.R.C. §§ 531-535.  The accumulated earnings tax is a tax equal to 15% per year on the 
accumulated taxable income retained by a corporation.   
 14 Personal holding company income is taxed at 15%.  The rules for classification as a PHC are set forth 
in § 541 et seq.   
 15 S-Corp pass-through treatment of income and loss is not identical to that of a partnership, but is very 
similar.  See I.R.C. § 1366 et seq.   
6First, there are numerous restrictions on the size of an S-Corp and the members 
who compose it.  The corporation must be a domestic corporation,16 it is limited to 100 
shareholders,17 and these shareholders must be individuals or estates who are not 
nonresident aliens.18 Ownership of S-Corp shares by a trust or estate is also severely 
limited by § 1361(c)(2). 
 Second, the S-Corp is limited to only one class of stock.19 This may not sound 
like a tremendous problem, but it can cause difficulties when there is some benefit to 
separating the ownership, financing, and control functions of shareholders.  There are 
some qualifications to this ‘one class of stock’ rule though.  The I.R.S. will not treat an S-
Corp as having more than one “class of stock solely because there are differences in 
voting rights among the shares of common stock.”20 What then, is the point of this rule if 
two shares of stock can have different voting rights yet not be termed different classes of 
stock?  Evidence seems to suggest that the I.R.S. added this unnecessary ambiguity for 
the dual purpose of avoiding the special allocation mess inherent in partnership taxation, 
and to prevent otherwise ineligible shareholders from obtaining convertible debt (stock in 
disguise) while avoiding disqualification of the S-Corp.21 
Finally, an S-Corp may loose its Subchapter S election in a variety of ways, and 
some of these ways are particularly relevant to real estate investments.  The passive 
investment income test, for example, applies when an S-Corp has “accumulated earnings 
and profits” at year end, and “gross receipts more than 25 percent of which are passive 
 
16 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1). 
 17 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A).  
 18 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(B)-(C).  
 19 I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D).  
 20 I.R.C. § 1361(c)(4).   
 21 Martin D. Ginsburg & J.S. Levin, The Subchapter S One-Class-of-Stock Regulation, Fried Frank, Jan. 
3, 2005, available at: http://www.ffhsj.com/reprints/oneclass.htm.  
7investment income.”22 If the S-Corp meets this test, then its passive income will be taxed 
at ordinary corporate rates prescribed by § 11(b), currently as high as 35%, which would 
negate the pass-through tax advantages of the S-Corp.23 Further, the corporation’s 
Subchapter S status may be revoked if it ceases to be a small business corporation,24 or if 
it meets other conditions under § 1362(d) relating to Subchapter C earnings and passive 
investment income.25 
C. The Partnership 
 In very general terms, a partnership is a business venture entered into between 
two or more people.  The most common reasons for entering into a partnership relate to 
the tax advantages of this entity.  For Federal income tax purposes, the partnership is not 
a taxable entity, and all income flows through to the individuals,26 thus avoiding the 
double taxation to which corporate profits are subject.  Several different entities fall 
within the general classification of “partnerships.”  Most common among these is the 
general partnership, but there are also limited partnerships, and limited liability 
companies, which, for tax purposes, are a partnership.27 Each entity has its benefits, and 
so this paper will consider each in turn.    
 
22 I.R.C. § 1375(a).  Passive investment income “is defined generally as gross receipts from royalties, 
rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and gains from sales or exchanges of stock or securities.”  118 
A.L.R.5th 597; citing I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(C)(i).  It is noteworthy that rents are not considered passive 
income if significant services are rendered.  See Reg. § 1.1362-2(c)(5)(ii)(B)(2); PLR 8926039; 1989 PLR 
LEXIS 1072. 
 23 I.R.C. § 1375(a).   
 24 See I.R.C. § 1362(d)(2)(A).   
 25 See I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(A)(i)(I)-(II). 
 26 I.R.C. § 701.   
 27 The IRS treats an LLC as a partnership unless the members elect treatment as a corporation, in which 
case they must file Form 8832.  A single-member LLC is a disregarded entity for tax purposes, and is 
treated as a sole proprietorship.   
8A general partnership is exceedingly simple to create.  There is generally no 
requirement that there be a written partnership agreement,28 and any joint venture by 
means of which any business is carried on, may constitute a partnership.29 
Notwithstanding this very general definition of a partnership, neither the mere co-
ownership of property, nor a joint undertaking to share expenses, is sufficient to create a 
partnership.30 
Once two or more people create a partnership their legal rights change, and their 
accounting becomes more complex.  First, the partners must begin to track both their 
“inside basis” and “outside basis” in the partnership.  This essentially means that the 
partners must keep one set of books to track their basis in the partnership, and another set 
of books to track the partnership’s basis in its assets.  Second, in making business 
decisions, the partners must consider what they can do as individuals, and what decisions 
must be made by the partnership as a whole.  As previously discussed, this becomes 
especially troublesome with § 1033 elections.31 Finally, there is the issue of liability.  A 
general partner is personally liable for the debts of a partnership,32 and so this exposure to 
liability may be yet another reason for choosing a different entity for one’s real estate 
investments, especially where rental property is involved.   
 In order to avoid unlimited liability, some investors have chosen to organize as a 
limited liability partnership.  There are numerous tax and non-tax advantages to 
 
28 Podell v. Comm’r, 55 T.C. 429, 431 (1970) (the factors in determining whether a “joint venture” is 
present include (1) whether there is an express or implied agreement, (2) for joint control of a business, (3) 
a contribution of money/property/services, and (4) a sharing of profits, but not necessarily losses).  See also 
Allison v. Comm’r, 35 T.C.M. 1069 (1976); Luna v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 1067 (1964).   
 29 McDougal v. Comm’r, 62 T.C. 720 (1974).  See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2).   
 30 See Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(2). 
 31 U.S.C.S., supra note 8 and accompanying text.    
 32 See Sloan v. Thornton, 249 Va. 492 (1995) (primarily considering the liability of a general partner in a 
limited partnership).   
9organizing as a limited partnership (“LP”) or limited liability partnership (“LLP”).33 One 
major advantage, at least in Virginia, is that an interest in the partnership is considered 
personal property, and so the transfer of an interest in an LP or LLP that holds real estate 
is the transfer of personal property, and not of real property.34 Thus, by transferring an 
interest in the partnership, the partner can avoid payment of state and local real property 
transfer taxes in some jurisdictions.35 These fees, though a small percentage of the 
purchase price, may be high enough to justify evasive planning methods in large real 
estate deals.36 
Many of the other tax and non-tax benefits of an LLP are similar to those 
associated with the general partnership.  The disadvantages associated with this form of 
ownership are few, but include the personal liability of general partners, and in some 
instances limited partners where they are not cautious in exercising management and 
control functions.37 There are, however, ample opportunities to plan around this potential 
liability,38 and so the limited partnership remains a popular choice of entity for real estate 
investment purposes.  
 
33 See Va. Code § 50-73.1 et seq. for the statutory requirements of this entity.   
 34 Va. Code § 50-73.44.  Forward v. Beucler, 702 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Va. 1988) (“A partnership interest 
-- regardless of the nature of the partnership's assets -- is personalty, not realty.”).  See also Uniform Ltd. 
P'ship Act (2001) § 701.   
 35 This is still the case in Virginia, but some jurisdictions (D.C. for instance) have modified their real 
property transfer tax statutes so that they apply to real property or any interest in that property.   
 36 In Arlington and Fairfax counties, this tax equals 0.433% of the purchase price of the property (0.25% 
state transfer tax, 0.0833% county transfer tax, and 0.1% grantor’s tax), that works out to $4,333 per 
million in land value.  The transfer taxes in Virginia are actually relatively low; in Prince George’s County, 
MD, for instance, the transfer tax is a whopping 2.34%, or $23,400 per million.   
 37 Va. Code § 50-73.24; C.F. Trust, Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. P'Ship, 306 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 2002) (A 
“limited partner may be liable for the obligations of the partnership if the limited partner is also a general 
partner or if he participates in the control of the business, but even then only to creditors that reasonably 
believe, based on the limited partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner.”).  
 38 Commonly employed tactics include exculpatory clauses in permanent mortgages, care in dealing 
with third parties (being sure that they know you are not a general partner), outside guarantors, and 
adequate insurance coverage.   
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 Even more popular than the limited partnership is the limited liability company 
(“LLC”).  The LLC is yet another statutory form of business which typically limits the 
personal liability of its owners to the amount of their investment.39 Though the LLC has 
many features of a corporation, it is treated as a partnership for tax purposes.40 
The LLC is a highly flexible entity.  In general, an LLC must have two or more 
members41 and must register in accordance with state statutory requirements, but once 
registered its membership (both in terms of composition and number) is virtually 
unlimited.42 There are, however, some minor disadvantages that accompany the 
flexibility of the LLC.  First, a member of an LLC generally cannot transfer his entire 
interest absent the unanimous written consent of all other members.43 Second, depending 
on the jurisdiction where the LLC is registered, the LLC may dissolve upon the 
happening of one of four events: 1) the expiration of the specified term of the LLC, 2) the 
unanimous written consent of the members, 3) the entry of a decree of judicial 
dissolution, or 4) automatic cancellation of the registration certificate.44 The LLC may 
contract around many of these provisions by modifying the articles of organization.  Such 
 
39 Va. Code § 13.1-1000 et seq.   
 40 Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360; codified at Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2. 
 41 A single member LLC is generally a disregarded entity, but it may elect treatment as a corporation for 
Federal income tax purposes.  See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2.   
 42 Unlike the S-Corp, LLC members may include individuals, partnerships, corporations, or any other 
business association.  Additionally, LLC’s are not subject to the 100 shareholder cap placed on S-Corps.   
 43 This is the general rule, but Va. Code § 13.1-1039 provides that unless the articles of organization 
state otherwise, a member may transfer all or part of his interest in an LLC to another.  Such assignment 
does not dissolve the LLC, nor does it entitle the assignee to participate in the management or control of the 
entity; rather, the assignee only has a right to receive “any share of profits and losses and distributions to 
which the assignor would be entitled.”  The assignee is not entitled to become a member absent a majority 
vote of current members.  Va. Code § 13.1-1040.   
 44 These factors are set forth in Va. Code § 13.1-1046.  It is notable that these factors are not the same in 
every state.  Many jurisdictions provide that the LLC shall terminate upon the death, retirement, 
resignation, bankruptcy, etc, of one of the members, but Virginia modifies this common law rule by statute.  
See Va. Code § 13.1-1040.2.   
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flexibility is one reason the LLC has become a popular choice for risky ventures such as 
real estate investing.45 
III. The Fifth Circuit Framework 
 Often, a real estate developer, realtor, or home builder will find it difficult to 
segregate real property held for investment purposes from that held as inventory in the 
ordinary course of business.  Thus, the IRS may seek to classify gains on the sale of 
property as ordinary rather than capital.  Such reclassification would result in 
substantially higher taxation as rates rise from 15% for long-term capital gains to 35% for 
ordinary income.46 There are however, planning techniques and statutory safe harbors 
available that serve to preserve capital gains treatment on the sale or transfer of 
undeveloped real estate.   
 The Fifth Circuit has a great deal of experience addressing issues surrounding real 
estate development partnerships, and so the framework developed in that circuit is 
presently employed in many jurisdictions.47 In order to determine whether an individual 
or partnership is selling a capital asset or property held for sale in the ordinary course of 
business, the Fifth Circuit begins by answering three principal questions:48 
1)  Was taxpayer engaged in a trade or business, and, if so, what business?  
 2)  Was taxpayer holding the property primarily for sale in that business?   
 
45 Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice for Doing Business, 41 U. FL.
L. REV. 721, 749 (1989).  
 46 I.R.C. §§ 1(a)-(i).   
 47 The Fifth Circuit (encompassing Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi) cases cited herein are only 
binding precedent in the Fifth and Eleventh circuits (prior to October 1, 1981).  THE BLUEBOOK: A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 10.8.2, at 96 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).  
 48 Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 171, 178 (5th Cir. 1980).  The court continues by 
stating that in cases with different factual patterns, other questions may include “whether the contemplated 
purchasers were customers of the taxpayers, or whether business activity is to be imputed to taxpayer so as 
to be considered taxpayer's business.”  Id.
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 3)  Were the sales contemplated by taxpayer ordinary in the course of that business? 
The court considers a number of factors in answering these questions.49 
The first factor considered is the “nature and purpose of the acquisition and the 
duration of ownership,”50 and the central purpose of this question is to determine the 
taxpayer’s motivation in holding the property at the time of sale.51 Recognizing that the 
taxpayer’s motive may change, courts have held that it is the course of conduct over a 
period of time, and not a pinpointed moment in time, that is relevant.52 In analyzing the 
taxpayer’s intent, courts often begin by looking to the taxpayer’s original purpose for 
acquiring the property.53 This “original purpose” analysis coincides with the court’s 
interpretation of § 1221(a)(1).  Courts look to the original purpose of the taxpayer to 
differentiate between assets held “primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course” 
of business and those held for investment purposes.54 
As used in § 1221, “‘primarily’ means ‘of first importance’ or ‘principally.’”55 
Often, one’s original purpose is synonymous with one’s primary purpose, but on occasion 
 
49 These factors range from five to nine in number, depending on the particular case.  The courts 
enunciating more factors simply tend to divide a single factor into several elements.  See Pritchett v. 
Comm’r, 63 T.C. 149, 162-63 (1974). 
 50 Daugherty v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 623, 629 (1982); citing United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 909-
10 (5th Cir. 1969); Smith v. Dunn, 224 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1955) (providing the first comprehensive 
analysis of the modern Fifth Circuit factors and listing “in chronological order, a dozen of our cases in 
which we have used language from which the tests listed are distilled”).  
 51 The Court states that while “it is the purpose for which property is held at the time of sale that 
determines tax treatment,” the “Court can and does look at earlier events to decide precisely what that 
purpose was when the sale was consummated.”  Id.; citing Biedermann v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 1, 11 (1977); 
Maddux Constr. Co. v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 1278, 1284 (1970). 
 52 Heller Trust v. Comm’r, 382 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir. 1967) (“Where the facts clearly demonstrate that 
a taxpayer held certain property as an investment, and further show that this purpose continued until shortly 
before the time of a sale, and that the sale is prompted by a liquidation intent, the taxpayer should not lose 
the benefits provided for by the capital gain provisions.”).  
 53 See Tollis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1993-63, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1951.   
 54 Heller Trust, 382 F.2d at 679.   
 55 Id.
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there is a dual purpose or changed purpose that skews this analysis.56 In differentiating 
between a dual purpose and a changed purpose the Tax Court has reasoned that:  
Where the acquisition and holding of property was for a dual purpose 
(either to develop for rental, or to sell) that a ‘substantial’ purpose is not 
necessarily the ‘primary’ purpose, but that the statutory word ‘primarily’ 
means ‘of first importance’ or ‘principally’  and that “the purpose of the 
statutory provision with which we deal is to differentiate between the 
‘profits and losses arising from the everyday operation of a business’ on 
the one hand (internal citation omitted) and ‘the realization of appreciation 
in value accrued over a substantial period of time’ on the other.”57 
In Bynum v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that though the taxpayers purchased a 
farm as an investment, their primary purpose for holding the farm changed when they 
subdivided the property, and at the time of sale they were “undoubtedly engaged in the 
vocation of selling lots” in the ordinary course of a trade or business.58 This analysis 
highlights the distinction between land held for a dual purpose, and that held for a 
changed purpose.  The former taxpayer may retain capital gains treatment if the 
investment purpose is his “primary purpose,”59 but the later taxpayer will be subject to 
ordinary income treatment though he purchased the property for investment purposes.60 
56 Id. at 679-80.  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that though the taxpayer’s original purpose for building 
duplexes was to hold them for sale to customers, his intent changed over time (he began an investment in 
rental property) and the “Tax Court was clearly erroneous in determining that the duplex operation was a 
continuance of taxpayer's business.”  
 57 Bynum v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 295, 298-99 (1966); citing Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966); Corn 
Prods. Co. v. Comm’r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). 
 58 Bynum, 46 T.C. at 299; citing Mauldin v. Comm’r, 195 F. 2d 714, 717 (1952).   
 59 Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966) (vacating and remanding 347 F.2d 23).  On remand, the court 
found that the property was held for investment purposes and granted capital gains treatment.  275 F. Supp. 
358 (Ca. 1966).   
 60 Byrnum, 46 T.C. at 299.  When there is evidence of a changed purpose (i.e. from investment to held-
for-sale) the IRS and courts will ordinarily ignore the prior purpose unless the change “results from 
unanticipated, externally induced factors which make impossible the continued pre-existing use of the 
realty.”  Biedenharn Realty Co., Inc. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 421 (5th Cir. 1975) (examples of such 
“externally induced factors” include: 1) Acts of God, 2) condemnation, or 3) new and unfavorable zoning 
regulations, among others).   
14
 As stated previously, the duration of ownership is yet another element courts 
consider in examining the intent of the taxpayer.61 Congress, and seemingly the Supreme 
Court, have long recognized that “capital gains...accruing over long periods of time” 
should not be taxed at the same rate as ordinary income.62 The logic behind this theory is 
that since capital gains accrue over a long period of time it would be inequitable to 
recognize the full amount of gain in one year, thereby pushing the taxpayer into a higher 
marginal tax bracket and charging him with a great burden in the year of sale.63 
Accordingly, the Tax Court has, on numerous occasions, considered the 
taxpayer’s retention of the property for a lengthy period of time indicative of an 
investment purpose.64 In Pritchett v. Commissioner, for example, the Tax Court held that 
land sold by a licensed realtor after an 11 year holding period was capital in nature 
despite the taxpayer’s status as a dealer.65 The Court reasoned that the taxpayer’s 
“lengthy retention of the property is indicative of petitioner's intention to hold it for 
 
61 Daugherty, 78 T.C. at 629; see supra note 50 and accompanying text.   
 62 Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1932); see Comm’r v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 
130, 134 (1960) (“This Court has long held that the term ‘capital asset’ is to be construed narrowly in 
accordance with the purpose of Congress to afford capital-gains treatment only in situations typically 
involving the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time, and thus to 
ameliorate the hardship of taxation of the entire gain in one year.”); Malat, 383 U.S. at 572 (differentiating 
ordinary income from “the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time”).  
 63 Id. “Before the Act of 1921, gains realized from the sale of property were taxed at the same rates as 
other income, with the result that capital gains, often accruing over long periods of time, were taxed in the 
year of realization at the high rates resulting from their inclusion in the higher surtax brackets.  The 
provisions of the 1921 revenue act for taxing capital gains at a lower rate, reenacted in 1924 without 
material change, were adopted to relieve the taxpayer from these excessive tax burdens on gains resulting 
from a conversion of capital investments, and to remove the deterrent effect of those burdens on such 
conversions.”  Id.; citing House Report No. 350, Ways and Means Committee, 67th Cong., 1st Session on 
the Rev. Bill of 1921, p. 10; see also Alexander v. King, 46 F.2d 235 (10th Cir. Okla. 1931). 
 64 See Pritchett v. Comm’r, 63 T.C. 149, 166-67 (1974); Municipal Bond Corp. v. Comm’r, 382 F.2d 
184, 189 (8th Cir. 1967) (considering time a major factor in ruling that property was held for investment); 
Schueber v. Comm’r, 371 F.2d 996, 999 (7th Cir. 1967) (property “held for realization of appreciation in 
value to be accrued over a substantial period of time” (9 years) was an investment).  
 65 63 T.C. at 166-67. 
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investment purposes.”66 Unfortunately, neither Pritchett nor its predecessors provide a 
bright-line test for how long is long enough when it comes to the holding period; but 
conveniently, this single factor is not dispositive of the question of whether property is 
held for investment purposes.67 
The second factor of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis is the extent and nature of the 
taxpayer’s efforts to sell the property.68 Some courts have hinted that the correct question 
is not whether the seller engaged others to assist him in efforts to sell the property, but 
whether he engaged in any such efforts at all.69 These selling efforts suggest that the 
taxpayer is pursuing customers and is no longer willing to hold the land; and when the 
taxpayer engages in these efforts himself, courts often consider this further evidence that 
he is engaged in the business of selling real estate.70 
The comparison of two cases turning on this point serves as an excellent example 
of the logic surrounding this factor.  In Thompson v. Commissioner, the taxpayer engaged 
in “regular and ordinary” sales of lots while not employing a broker; nor did he advertise, 
 
66 Id. The court also thought it important that over this eleven year period the “petitioner never 
improved or subdivided this land, offered it for sale, posted ‘for sale’ signs on it, or advertised it.”  Id. at 
167.  
 67 Id. at 162-63; citing Thrift v. Comm’r, 15 T.C. 366, 369 (1950) (no single factor “can be regarded as 
determinative, but the question must be viewed in the light of all pertinent factors and particularly the facts 
of the individual case”).    
 68 Daugherty v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 623, 629 (1982); see supra note 50.   
 69 See Sanders v. United States, 740 F.2d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Merely because the appellant 
himself did not actively advertise or sell directly to the home buyers does not mean he was not engaged in 
the real estate business.”).   
 70 Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 418-19 (5th Cir. 1975).  The court rejected 
Biedenharn’s argument “that one who is not already in the trade or business of selling real estate does not 
enter such business when he employs a broker who acts as an independent contractor.”  The court reasoned 
that when the landowner retains substantial control over the sales function (in this instance he set prices and 
established credit policies) the “brokers did not so completely take charge of the whole of the...sales as to 
permit [Biedenharn Realty] to wall itself off legally from [the broker’s] activities.”  Id. But see Estate of 
Barrios v. Comm’r, 265 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1959).  In Estate of Barrios the court ruled that land was held 
for investment purposes where taxpayer “never engaged in any form of advertising, or employed a real 
estate agent, or solicited a prospective purchaser.”  Id. at 520.  Clearly, the employment of a real estate 
agent, in itself, is not determinative of this issue. 
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post signs, conduct an organized sales program, or haggle over prices.71 Nonetheless, the 
court reasoned that his sales were taxable as ordinary income because he engaged in 
“extensive” sales activities related to a large number of lots (though not in the tax years at 
issue) in the same subdivision.72 In Pritchett v. Commissioner however, the court 
declined to classify the sale of several properties held by a real estate broker as ordinary 
income.73 The court looked to the fact that Pritchett “made no effort to sell or improve” 
these properties, nor did he advertise it or solicit buyers, and each buyer approached 
Pritchett about the purchase of the properties concerned.74 Thus, the court reasoned that 
Pritchett maintained his investment motive because he “simply held [the land] passively, 
allowing it to appreciate.”75 
The third factor of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis is the “frequency, number, and 
continuity of sales.”76 Although there is no bright-line test with respect to this element, 
the courts have held that “the frequency and substantiality of sales are highly probative 
on the issue of holding purpose because the presence of frequent sales ordinarily belies 
the contention that property is being held ‘for investment’ rather than ‘for sale.’  And the 
frequency of sales may often be a key factor in determining the ‘ordinariness’ 
question.”77 Though there appear to be no cases where this factor alone is 
 
71 322 F.2d 122, 126-28 (5th Cir. 1963).   
 72 Id. at 124.  Citing Thompson v. United States, 136 Ct.Cl. 671, 145 F. Supp. 534 (1956) (prior suit 
against same taxpayer, but covering different tax years).  Taxpayer made the mistake of admitting that his 
sales activity did not change substantially over the years (even after the tax years covered by 145 F. Supp. 
534, where the court found “extensive” sales activities) and that “after the subdividing of any of the 
property, naturally it was available for sale...”  Id. at 127.   
 73 63 T.C. 149 (1974).   
 74 Pritchett, 63 T.C. at 165-66.   
 75 Id. at 165.   
 76 Id. at 162-63.  This is actually the fourth factor in the Pritchett analysis, but that court arranges the 
factors differently.  The Suburban Realty court asserts that this is the most important factor in determining 
whether the taxpayer is engaged in the real estate business.  615 F.2d at 178.   
 77 Suburban Realty Co., 615 F.2d at 178.  Each case listed in footnotes 78-83 supports this proposition, 
and some, such as Matz, explicitly state their concurrence.   
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determinative,78 courts have held that: 376 lots over 15 years constitutes a trade,79 244 
sales over 33 years constitutes a trade,80 sales of 15 lots per year over 5 years is a trade or 
business,81 sale of 38 lots over 3 years is a trade or business,82 and the sale of 63 
properties over more than 20 years was not a trade or business.83 
The courts have not stipulated any particular number of sales that pushes an 
investor over the threshold into the realm of business activity;84 rather, courts evaluate all 
of the factors together, and one consideration closely related to the number of sales is the 
substantiality of income derived from those sales.85 In Adam v. Commissioner the Tax 
Court held that the taxpayers, husband and wife, were not engaged in the real estate 
business though they purchased and sold approximately twelve coastal Maine properties 
over a three year period.  Among the factors considered by the Court was “the relative 
amounts of income from the taxpayer’s regular business and from the property 
transactions” at issue.86 The Court reasoned that “the significant difference in income 
generated by the two activities tends to show that Mr. Adam’s real estate dealings were 
investment activities.”87 
78 See Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1975) (Reasoning that 
“although frequency and substantiality of sales are not usually conclusive, they occupy the preeminent 
ground in our analysis.”). 
 79 Thompson, 322 F.2d at 124-25.   
 80 Id. at 174.   
 81 Sanders v. United States, 740 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 82 Biedenharn Realty Co., 526 F.2d at 416.   
 83 Matz v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1998-334, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 465, 16-18 (1998).   
 84 In Sanders, for instance, the taxpayer sold an average of only 3 lots per year, but the court held that he 
was engaged in a trade or business.  Yet, in Matz, the taxpayer sold an average of 3.15 lots per year, and in 
Gartrell the taxpayers sold an average of 5.11 lots per year, and the court held that they were not engaged 
in a trade or business.  Gartrell v. United States, 619 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1980).  As a general rule of thumb, 
three sales per year seems to be near the upper end of a permissible number of sales, at least so long as the 
other 5th Circuit factors favor the investor.   
 85 See Adam v. Comm’r, 60 T.C. 996, 999-1000 (1973).   
 86 Adam, 60 T.C. at 999; citing Real Estate Corp. v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 610 (1961), aff’d, 301 F. 2d 423 
(C.A. 10 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 822 (1962), reh’g denied, 371 U.S. 917 (1962).  
 87 Adam, 60 T.C. at 1000.  Mr. Adam was a CPA and partner at a large accounting firm in Maine, and 
“the net gain from his real estate activities was approximately 5 percent of his total income in 1967, 16 
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 The fourth factor of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis is the extent of subdividing, 
developing and advertising engaged in to increase sales.88 In numerous cases courts have 
held that extensive development activity is evidence of a business,89 and not the mere 
liquidation of an investment.90 This extensive activity often includes subdivision into 
residential lots, the grading and surfacing of streets, the installation of drainage facilities 
and utilities, and other similar improvements.91 
It is important to note however, that when the taxpayer undertakes “purely legal 
steps to make [the property] more marketable” those actions will ordinarily not weigh 
against the taxpayer.92 In Buono v. Commissioner the court held that the taxpayers were 
entitled to capital gains treatment despite their “improvement” of an undeveloped tract of 
land.93 The evidence showed that the taxpayers formed an S-Corp for the purpose of 
purchasing an undeveloped tract of land, and that they intended to sell the entire tract as 
soon as they could obtain appropriate subdivision approvals from the local 
 
percent in 1968, and 30 percent in 1969.”  Id. For further cases considering the substantiality of income, 
see Estate of Webb v. Comm’r, 30 T.C. 1202 (1958), and Hoover v. Comm’r, 32 T.C. 618 (1959).   
 88 Adam, 60 T.C. at 1000 (“Mr. Adam did not plot or subdivide any of his waterfront properties. He did 
not add any structures or facilities to them.  They were sold in the same physical condition in which they 
were purchased.  Mr. Adam made some surveys, obtained some rights-of-way, and extinguished an 
easement over at least one of the properties, but such activities were not significant.”); Biedenharn Realty 
Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1975) (Court held that extensive development and 
improvement raised activity to the level of a business).   
 89 See Rev. Rul. 59-91, 1959-1 C.B. 15; Sanders v. United States, 740 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1984); Gault 
v. Comm’r, 332 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1964).   
 90 Biedenharn Realty Co., 526 F.2d at 418.  The Court engages in an interesting analysis of the 
“liquidation plus integrally related improvements theory” under which the taxpayer may be able to escape 
ordinary income treatment if engaged in a liquidation of the investment.  Id. at 417-18, 420-21.  There is 
also a valuable statutory safe harbor in § 1237(a).  Though this safe harbor is seldom used because it 
requires a 5-year holding period, it prevents the reclassification of subdivided property so long as the 
taxpayer is not a dealer in real estate and the taxpayer has not made “substantial improvements” to the 
parcel.  There are numerous special rules that apply to this section.  See I.R.C. §§ 1237(a)(2)(A)-(C), 
1237(b) and (c).  
 91 Rev. Rul. 59-91, 1959-1 C.B. 15. 
 92 Buono v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 187, 201 (1980). 
 93 Id. at 187. 
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municipality.94 The taxpayers ultimately sold the tract five years later and the court 
reasoned that though the subdivision of the property took the taxpayers “in the direction 
of the indistinct line of demarcation between investment and dealership,” their “purely 
legal steps” were insufficient to cross the line since they intended to sell the property as a 
single tract.95 
The final three factors often considered in the Fifth Circuit’s analysis are the 
taxpayer’s use of a business office for the sale of property, the character and degree of 
supervision or control exercised by the taxpayer over any representative selling the 
property, and the time and effort the taxpayer habitually devoted to the sales.96 Courts do 
not typically discuss these three factors in great detail, and so they receive commensurate 
treatment here.  Essentially, the taxpayer’s goal should be to minimize or eliminate the 
court’s consideration of each of these factors.   
 
IV. Substance over Form 
 As is typical in tax matters, the substance of a transaction is more important than 
its form.  In building on the Fifth Circuit’s framework discussed in the previous section, 
this section explores various real estate investment partnership transactions that have, and 
have not, been upheld by the courts.  For an introductory example, assume that partners A 
and B form partnership P, an LLC formed under Virginia law.97 In 2000, P purchased a 
 
94 Id.
95 Id. at 201.  The Court also notes that many decisions have followed similar lines of reasoning, and the 
Court, in following the 5th Circuit’s decision in Winthrop, rejects the Commissioner’s overly broad reading 
of the “taxpayer efforts” rule.  Id. at 204; citing United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d at 909.  
 96 Biedenharn Realty Co., 526 F.2d at 415.  The Graves court provides these tests as applied by the 
Fourth Circuit; the listing is not substantially different, but the Fourth Circuit does not emphasize the last 
three factors.  Graves v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 199, 202 (4th Cir. 1989).   
 97 The next section will explore the technical details of partnership tax law and examine how the Code 
influences the life cycle of a typical real estate investment partnership. 
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parcel of undeveloped land for $1 million in cash.  Six years later, A and B want to sell 
this property and maximize the amount of money in their pockets, what should they do?98 
A. A Simple Sale of Undeveloped Property 
 The first option is for A and B to take the easy route.  If P sells the undeveloped 
land to Z LLC, an unrelated developer, for $2 million, P could recognize a long term 
capital gain of $1 million.  A and B would each take $500,000 in gain and pay $75,000 in 
taxes; that would put $425,000 in cash in their pockets, but why would they do this when 
they can make more?  What would happen, for instance, if A and B instead sold the 
property to Y LLC, a development company wholly owned by A and B?  Could they then 
charge a higher price for the property to increase their capital gain and decrease the 
ordinary income recognized on the development activity of Y LLC?99 
Unfortunately, this activity is not quite kosher in the eyes of the I.R.S.  Section 
707(b)(2) serves to convert P’s capital gain into ordinary income because Y is a related 
party, and thus the parcel is not a capital asset in the hands of Y.  For the purposes of § 
707(b)(2)100 a related party transaction includes those between (i) a “partnership and a 
person owning, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the...interest...in such 
partnership, or (ii) between two partnerships in which the same persons own, directly or 
 
98 For the sake of simplicity, this example ignores the details of how the partners started up and funded 
the partnership, and it also assumes that A and B are equal partners and that both are in the highest tax 
bracket.  More detailed transactions will be considered later.   
 99 A scheme of this sort might be organized as such:  P sells property (FMV of $2 million) to Y for $4 
million.  Y subdivides the property into 100 lots and makes improvements thereon.  Y sells all lots to R, a 
realtor who happens to be a friend of A and B, for $4.5 million ($45,000 each).  A and B, as partners of P, 
recognize a combined long term capital gain of $3 million, and recognize ordinary income of $500,000 on 
the development activities of Y.  Again, this is where substance over form comes into play. 
 100 A “related party” is also defined by I.R.C. § 453(g)(2), § 1239(b), and § 707(b)(1)(B).  Note that 
sections may define the term slightly differently.   
21
indirectly, more than 50 percent...”  In any such related party transaction the “gain 
recognized shall be considered as ordinary income.”101 
In this example, if the gain is properly reclassified as ordinary income, P would 
ultimately recognize a $3.5 million gain, with A and B each paying approximately 
$612,500 in taxes and taking home $1,137,500.102 The tax implications of this 
transaction are very similar to what would result if A and B simply developed the land 
themselves and sold it to numerous buyers in the ordinary course of business. 
 
B. The Sale of Undeveloped Property to a Related Corporation 
 The previous example demonstrates how the sale of undeveloped property to a 
related partnership can create a trap for the unwary, but what if P instead sells the 
property to a related corporation?  Assume, for example, that P sells the property to X 
Corp., a real estate development corporation owned equally by A and B, for $4 million.  
In this example, § 707(b)(2) does not apply to reclassify the gain as ordinary income.103 
Furthermore, no other section applies to reclassify this transaction because the property is 
not “subject to the allowance for depreciation.”104 Were this property subject to 
depreciation, the gain would be reclassified under § 1239(a), but since X Corp. holds the 
land as inventory the $3 million gain retains its classification as a capital gain.105 
Accordingly, A and B would recognize a capital gain of $3 million on the sale from P to 
 
101 I.R.C. § 707(b)(2)(B).  
 102 If these amounts were not reclassified as ordinary income under § 707 partners A and B would pay 
taxes of only $312,500 each, and would take home $1,437,500. 
 103 I.R.C. § 707(b)(2) only applies to transactions between a partnership and an owner of that 
partnership, or between two or more partnerships; it does not apply to sales between a partnership and a 
corporation. 
 104 I.R.C. § 1239(a)-(b).  Remember, this example contemplates the sale of a parcel of raw land.  
 105 I.R.C. § 167(a).  Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 provides that an allowance for depreciation “does not apply 
to inventories or stock in trade, or to land apart from the improvements or physical development added to 
it.” 
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X Corp., and pay taxes of $225,000 each.  Then, assuming X Corp. sold these lots for a 
gain of $500,000, A and B would each take home $111,069 of this gain,106 for a total gain 
on the deal of $1,386,069. 
 While this transaction appears to easily foil the Commission’s reclassification as 
ordinary income it is very important to note that these transactions can be tricky, and the 
Commission may argue that an agency relationship exists between the purchaser and 
seller, or that the parties were not dealing at arm’s length.107 If there is an agency 
relationship between the parties, the activities of the purchaser are relevant to determine 
whether the seller intended to hold the land as an investment or in the ordinary course of 
business.108 Among the factors considered by the Commission in determining whether an 
agency relationship exists between the parties are: 
 1) The magnitude of the seller’s activity with respect to the property.109 
2) The length of time between the seller’s purchase and sale of the land.110 
3) Seller’s purchase and sale of other properties and general experience and    
 involvement in real estate.111 
106 In order to calculate this figure X Corp. must have exactly $500,000 (at a marginal rate of 34%) in 
income and A and B must pay individual income taxes at a marginal rate of 35%.  Corporate income taxes 
would equal $158,250, and individual income taxes would equal $119,613, for a total of $277,863 in taxes 
(a composite rate of 55.57%).  See I.R.C. § 11(b).  
 107 I.R.S. Information Release 2002-0013 (3/29/02).  If an “agency relationship exists between the seller 
entity and the related purchaser entity...the purchaser entity’s activities are relevant to the determination of 
whether the seller entity intended to hold the land as an investment.”  Id. at 2.   
 108 Id.
109 Id. This is the most important factor according to the IRS.  The activity of the taxpayer in Brown is 
particularly indicative of an agency relationship.  In that case the seller “contacted an engineering company 
to find out where streets and utilities would be located and had the land platted and approved by his local 
planning commission prior to selling the land to his corporation.  With respect to another tract of land, the 
seller had his attorney initiate the formation of a local public works authority for the purpose of having the 
city construct a sewer system on the tract before selling the land to his corporation.”  Brown v. Comm’r, 
448 F.2d 514, 517 (10th Cir. 1971).   
 110 Release, supra note 107 at 3-4.  A short holding period is indicative of an agency relationship and/or 
an intent to sell to customers.  See Brown, 448 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding periods of 7 to 8 
months); Tibbals v. United States, 362 F.2d 266, 270 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (a few days after purchasing property 
taxpayer “petitioned the county for water, sewer and street improvements, which were begun in autumn 
1951,” and he sold some lots to his corporation as early as April 1951, and sold the remaining 100 lots by 
June 1952); Boyer v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 316 (1972) (“Sellers entered into a contract to purchase land on 
April 4, 1966 and closed on May 25, 1966,” but by May 12, 1966 they “entered into a contract to sell their 
land to their corporation...for twice what they paid for it.”).  
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 4) Seller’s purpose with respect to the land.112 
In light of these factors, it is important that a partnership that desires to sell investment 
property to a related corporation be very careful in how they structure the deal and be 
cautious of issues that might give the Commission any opportunity to challenge the 
transaction.   
 C. Sale to a Related Corporation – Phelan v. Commissioner 
As evidenced above, a sale of undeveloped land to a related corporation may be 
structured so as to preserve capital gains, and Phelan v. Commissioner is just one such 
success story.113 This section provides a brief analysis of what the taxpayers did 
correctly, and what could be improved to ensure that such a transaction goes more 
smoothly for other investors.  In Phelan, partners A, B, and C owned 40%, 40%, and 
20% of the partnership and corporation, respectively.114 
In 1994 the petitions and two other men organized the Jackson Creek Land Co. 
(JCLC), and soon thereafter they purchased a 1050 acre tract of land in Colorado for $2.9 
million.115 Two years later the same group of investors formed Vision Development 
Corp. (Vision) for the purpose of developing a 46.5 acre parcel of the Jackson Creek tract 
 
111 Release, supra note 107 at 4.  See Brown, 448 F.2d 514 (seller’s purchase and development of 
multiple tracts of land during the same period of time evidenced his involvement in the real estate business 
and his lack of investment intent); H-H Ranch, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 F.2d 885, 886-87 (7th Cir. 1966) 
(“Selling corporation lacked investment intent based on a ultimate finding that...the selling corporation was 
in the business of subdividing real property into improved lots and selling such lots to customers.  The H-H 
Ranch court also cited the fact that the shareholder of the selling corporation had been in the building 
business since 1914.”).  
 112 Release, supra note 107 at 4-5.  Where the previous three factors fail to clearly establish the seller’s 
intent the court will look to the seller’s stated investment purpose, if any.  Id. In Bramblett, the court 
considered “the selling partnership’s stated purpose of acquiring property for investment purposes.”  960 
F.2d at 531.   
 113 T.C. Memo 2004-206, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 223. 
 114 Id. at 7. 
 115 Id. at 1-5.  The Court also found that JCLC’s intent at the time of purchasing the land was to hold it 
for investment purposes, and so they did not advertise the Jackson Creek property for sale.  Id. at 5.   
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for resale to a homebuilder.116 In 1996 JCLC conveyed this parcel to Vision for 
$1,571,145 and the members of JCLC claimed a long term capital gain of $47,319 with 
respect to this transaction.117 This fact pattern thus presented the court with “the purely 
factual question of whether gain from the sale of real property resulted in ordinary or 
capital gain income.”118 
The I.R.S., of course, contended that the development activity on the Jackson 
Creek property was done at the behest of JCLC119 or, alternatively, that the sale of 
Jackson Creek from JCLC to Vision “was done solely for tax avoidance and had no 
independent business purpose.”120 The Tax Court, however, analogized this case to 
Bramblett,121 where the Fifth Circuit analyzed a similar fact pattern and concluded that 
“the business activities of the corporation were not attributable to the partnership.”122 
Both the Phelan and Bramblett courts relied on the Supreme Court’s holding “that where 
the form chosen by the taxpayer is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory 
realities, is imputed with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-
avoidance features, the form should be honored by the Government.”123 Likewise, in this 
 
116 Id. at 7-8. 
 117 Id. at 7. 
 118 Id. at 11.  The Tax Court Memo goes into significantly greater detail about the business relationships 
surrounding this transaction and other ventures in which the partners were involved, but those facts are not 
necessary for the purpose of this analysis.   
 119 See Release, supra note 107 and accompanying text.  Essentially, the IRS argues that due to the 
common ownership of JCLC and Vision, they are affiliated entities and the acts of one should be imputed 
to the other.  T.C. Memo 2004-206, at 17. 
 120 T.C. Memo 2004-206, at 21.  Again, the IRS complains that the acts of Vision should be imputed to 
JCLC.   
 121 Bramblett v. Comm’r, 960 F.2d 526, 528 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 122 T.C. Memo 2004-206, at 21-22. 
 123 Id. at 22; citing Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583 (1978).  See also, Bramblett, 960 
F.2d at 533. 
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instance, there were legitimate business reasons to organize Vision, and so the Tax Court 
concluded that Vision’s development activity was not attributable to JCLC.124 
So, notwithstanding the fact that this transaction was challenged by the I.R.S., 
JCLC must have done something right to win this case.  By examining what they did 
correctly (and how their efforts may be improved) we can create a relatively reliable 
model for future transactions.  First, and perhaps most importantly, JCLC and Vision 
observed all corporate formalities.125 The Tax Court considers important the fact that 
they observed all such formalities and created Vision for a legitimate business purpose.  
Second, JCLC purchased the land and held it for approximately four years before selling 
a single parcel.126 The Court reasoned that the “frequency and substantiality of sales is 
the most important factor to be considered,”127 and the two sales by JCLC in four years 
“were of insufficient frequency to support the conclusion that JCLC’s sales were in the 
ordinary course of business.”128 
Third, while the Court did not spend a substantial amount of time discussing these 
factors, they did mention that the partners did not hold real estate licenses,129 they did not 
advertise the property for sale or hire agents to sell the property,130 and all sales were 
unsolicited.131 Finally, the Court noted that JCLC was responsible for only limited 
improvements to the property and “did not have employees or engage in any business 
 
124 T.C. Memo 2004-206, at 23.  The Petitioner (Phelan) conceded that, unlike in Bramblett, there was 
no need to protect the partnership from unlimited liability, but he argued (and the Court agreed) that there 
was a legitimate business purpose for the organization of Vision; namely, to protect JCLC’s sole asset, the 
remaining tract of land.  Id.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 24. 
 127 Id. at 23; citing Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1980).   
 128 T.C. Memo 2004-206, at 24-25.   
 129 Id. at 2. 
 130 Id. at 5, 17.  
 131 Id. at 17. 
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outside of holding and selling a limited number of parcels...”132 From this case, and 
others analyzed herein, there are a number of factors that the real estate investment 
partnership should be conscious of when engaging in such transactions: 1) the terms of 
the sale should always be established on an arm’s-length basis,133 2) all formalities of the 
sale should be respected by the parties,134 3) all corporate formalities should be respected 
in all activities,135 4) the purchase price should not be contingent on the sales efforts of 
the developer,136 5) the developer corporation should not pre-sell any property or engage 
in development activity before settling with the partnership,137 6) the development 
activity of the partnership should be strictly limited to legal improvements only,138 7) the 
ownership structure of the entities should be varied,139 and 8) the investors should limit 
the number of transactions engaged in by any single real estate investment partnership.140 
132 Id. at 18.  The limited improvements made to the property were primarily legal in nature and 
included the preliminary and final site plan approvals and a Preliminary Geotechnical Investigation (soil 
test).  The Court reasoned that these improvements fell well short of those permitted in other cases and did 
not serve to establish an “ordinary course of business.  Id. at 25-26. 
 133 Release, supra note 107 and accompanying text.  See also Bramblett v. Comm’r, 960 F.2d 526 (5th 
Cir. 1992). 
 134 If formalities are not observed the parties may bear the risk that loans/debt will be deemed a capital 
contribution.  See Burr Oaks Corp. v. Comm’r, 365 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1966) (holding that the transfer of 
land in exchange for promissory notes constituted a capital contribution and not a sale); Aqualane Shores, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 269 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that the transfer of property to a thinly capitalized 
corporation constituted a contribution of “risk capital”); Bradshaw v. United States, 683 F.2d 365 (Cl. Ct. 
1982) (upholding transaction because price reflected fair market value and the formalities of sale were 
strictly observed).  
 135 Phelan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2004-206, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 223. 
 136 Release, supra note 107 and accompanying text.   
 137 Boyer, supra note 110 and accompanying text.  
 138 See supra note 132.  See also Buono, supra note 92 and accompanying text.  
 139 Though this is not a strict requirement, courts are somewhat suspect of arrangements where the two 
entities have identical common ownership.  See Bramblett v. Comm’r, 960 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 140 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.  Since the “frequency and substantiality” of sales is one 
of the most important factors in determining whether the court will afford capital gains treatment it is best 
to present the court with a partnership that has engaged in very few transactions when possible.  Id.
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V. The Life Cycle of a Real Estate Investment Partnership 
 Thus far, this paper has concentrated on the legal precedent that supports a viable 
real estate investment partnership.  Though this precedent establishes the foundation of 
partnerships and transactions that the courts will sustain, in many respects it neglects the 
underlying details of how the Internal Revenue Code works to shape the operation of the 
partnership.  This section focuses on the continuous interplay between the Code and a 
typical real estate investment partnership from formation to dissolution.  
 
A. Formation 
 While it is possible for a partnership to arise unintentionally,141 is not typical for 
the vast majority of real estate investment partnerships.  Rather, a well-planned real estate 
investment partnership will organize as an LLC and register under the laws of the state 
where it plans to conduct business.142 Further, there are a number of elections that the 
partnership must make upon formation.143 The first of these elections is whether the LLC 
wants to be treated, for tax purposes, as a corporation or a partnership.144 Ordinarily, the 
answer to this question is rather straightforward – partnerships pay less in taxes because 
they are not subject to double taxation, and so a real estate investment partnership will 
almost always elect treatment as a partnership.   
 
141 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 142 See Va. Code § 13.1-1000 et seq.; § 13.1-1007 makes it unlawful (a Class 1 misdemeanor) to transact 
business as an LLC in Virginia unless authorized to do so. 
 143 Most of these elections may not actually be made until the first tax return is filed by the partnership, 
but they are addressed early in this section for the sake of simplicity. 
 144 Treasury Form 8832; see also Reg. § 301-7701 et seq. for details on this election.  Also note that a 
single-member LLC is typically treated as a disregarded entity for tax purposes.  See supra note 27. 
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 Second, the partnership must determine whether it will qualify as an electing large 
partnership (“ELP”).145 While this election will not apply to the vast majority of real 
estate investment partnerships it is worth noting because it may offer substantial savings 
related to accounting expenses when available.146 In order to qualify as an ELP the 
partners must not perform substantial services,147 the partnership must have 100 or more 
partners,148 and the partnership must elect classification as an ELP.149 
The third common election is a § 754 election.  When an incoming partner 
purchases the partnership interest of another, he ordinarily assumes the seller’s pro rata 
share of the partnership’s adjusted basis in its property.150 In many instances this does 
not cause a problem, but if the partnership assets have appreciated significantly the 
“difference between the new partner’s inside and outside basis can be substantial.”151 
The result is that the new partner may be deprived of depreciation deductions and his 
gain from subsequent property dispositions may be artificially inflated.152 Section 754 
was created to remedy this problem by equalizing a new partner’s inside and outside 
 
145 See I.R.C. §§ 771-77. 
 146 The 100+ member requirement will disqualify most real estate investment partnerships.  I.R.C. § 
775(a)(1)(A).  Reduced accounting expenses ordinarily result from the simplified flow-through structure of 
an ELP and the simplified K-1. 
 147 I.R.C. § 775(b)(1)-(2).  The partnership is excluded from making an ELP election if “substantially all 
the partners...are individuals performing substantial services in connection with the activities of such 
partnership or are personal service corporations,” or are retired partners who performed substantial 
services, or spouses of partners who are performing, or previously performed, such services.  Id.
148 I.R.C. § 775(a)(1)(A). 
 149 I.R.C. § 775(a)(1)(B).  This election applies to the taxable year for which made and all subsequent 
years unless revoked or there are fewer than 100 partners.  § 775(a)(1)-(2). 
 150 Paul J. Streer & Caroline D. Strobel, Tax Effects on Partnership and Limited Liability Company 
Interests: Using Section 754 Elections to Enhance Value and Marketability, THE CPA JOURNAL, Feb. 2005, 
at 1. 
 151 Id.
152 Id.
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basis.153 This section works in conjunction with §§ 743(b) and 734(b),154 and once the 
election is made it is very difficult to revoke.155 
The § 754 election is generally beneficial, but in some instances a partnership 
may determine that it either does not want to make the initial election or it wants to 
revoke the election.  The two principal reasons for avoiding the election are that it 
increases paperwork and accounting expenses, and it may be detrimental where an 
incoming partner’s inside basis exceeds his outside basis.156 Further, there is a “safety-
valve provision” that may, in limited circumstances, work to protect a new partner even 
when the partnership does not have a § 754 election in place.157 This provision does not, 
however, have exactly the same effect as § 754 and is limited to property that is 
distributed within two years after the partnership interest is transferred.158 Further, the 
provision has no effect until a distribution is made and, in some situations, the I.R.S. may 
force the application of this provision outside the two year timeframe when the fair 
market value of property distributed exceeds 110% of its adjusted basis to the partnership 
at the time of acquisition by the new partner.159 
153 See I.R.C. § 743(b)(1).  
 154 I.R.C. § 743(b) requires the partnership to allocate any basis adjustment to its assets and “separately 
compute the incoming partner’s annual share of depreciation and gain or loss from the sale of its property.”  
Streer, supra note 150 at 2.  I.R.C. § 734(b) results in an adjustment to the partnership’s basis for its 
remaining property following a distribution of cash or property to the partners.  Id.
155 The I.R.S. must consent to any revocation of the § 754 election and valid reasons for the revocation 
are generally limited to: a change in the nature of the partnership business, a substantial increase in the 
number of assets in the partnership, a change in the character of partnership assets, or an increased 
frequency of retirements or ownership shifts.  Streer, supra note 150 at 3; citing Reg. § 1.754-1(c).  
 156 This scenario could result in a negative basis adjustment which would require the partner to report 
more gain, or less loss, on the disposition of partnership property.  The I.R.S. will not grant a revocation of 
the § 754 election if this problem arises.  Streer, supra note 150 at 5. 
 157 Id. at 4-5; see I.R.C. § 732(d).   
 158 I.R.C. § 732(d). 
 159 Id.; see also Streer, supra note 150 at 4-5. 
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 Finally, in limited circumstances, the partnership may elect treatment under I.R.C. 
§ 761.160 This election, when made, permits the partnership to avoid the application of 
Subchapter K.161 However, this election is limited to partnerships that operate for 
investment purposes only and do not provide services, and where the partners own the 
property as co-owners.162 The requirement that partners own the property as co-owners 
and reserve the right to separately dispose of their interest typically disqualifies the use of 
this section for real estate investment purposes.163 
Beyond the matter of elections taken, the partnership must be certain to capitalize 
and deduct organizational expenses as appropriate.  Section 709 provides the rules 
controlling the deduction of organizational and syndication fees.164 Under this section 
the partnership may deduct certain expenses immediately, while capitalizing others and 
amortizing them over a 180-month period. 165 Generally, organizational expenses are 
those which are incident to the creation of the partnership,166 chargeable to capital 
account, and are of a character which, if expended incident to the creation of a 
 
160 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 161 I.R.C. § 761(a). 
 162 I.R.C. § 761(a)(1)-(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(2). 
 163 Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(2)(i)-(ii).  Where the partners own the property as co-owners the dissent of 
even one partner may thwart attempts of the others to sell or refinance the property.  Further, where a § 761 
election is in effect, any loss upon the sale of property is generally a capital loss.  See Yarbro v. Comm’r, 
737 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 164 I.R.C. § 709(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.709-1.  Technically § 709(b) provides for an election, but that 
election is simply made by attaching a statement to the partnership’s return for the tax year in which the 
partnership begins business.  This statement must set forth each organizational expense incurred, the 
amount of that expense, the date incurred, and the month in which the partnership began business.  Treas. 
Reg. § 1.709-1(c).  
 165 I.R.C. § 709(b)(1).  It is important to remember that the amortization period defined in § 
709(b)(1)(B) recently changed from 60 months to 180 months; this was modified by the American Jobs 
Creation Act of 2004.  An alternative election under § 709(b)(1)(A) may also permit the partnership to 
deduct up to $5,000 of these expenses in the first year of operations. 
 166 Generally, an expense is “incident to the creation of the partnership” if “incurred during the period 
beginning at a point which is a reasonable time before the date prescribed by law (without regard for 
extensions) for filing the partnership return for the year in which the partnership begins business.  Further, 
these expenses must be for the creation of the partnership, not for its operation, and are expenses of a nature 
normally expected to benefit the partnership throughout its entire life.  Treas. Reg. § 1.709-2(a). 
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partnership having an ascertainable life would be amortized over that time.167 Such 
organizational expenses commonly include legal fees, accounting fees, and filing fees 
incurred before the partnership begins business.168 The issue of when a partnership 
“begins business” is more contentious than one might initially expect, but is too weighty 
of a topic for substantial discussion at this point.169 
B. Financing and Land Acquisition 
 Once the real estate investment partnership is organized it must tackle the 
formidable task of financing operations and searching for assets that will yield an 
acceptable rate of return.  In the perfect world, all of the partners would contribute large 
amounts of cash and nothing else.  While this may be somewhat common for real estate 
investment partnerships, there is also a strong likelihood that one partner will enter with a 
large parcel of land and rely on the expertise of the other partners to help him make the 
most of his investment.  Alternatively, all of the partners may come in with a small 
amount of equity and rely on other sources to finance their investment. 
 Generally, when a partner contributes property (i.e. a large tract of undeveloped 
land) to the partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership there is no 
 
167 I.R.C. § 709(b)(3). 
 168 All of these expenses must be “incident to the organization of the partnership” and do not include 
such expenses as those connected with the acquisition of partnership assets, the transfer of assets to the 
partnership, expenses connected with the admission or removal of partners (outside of the initial 
partnership organization), and expenses associated with the ongoing operations of the partnership.  See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.709-2(a). 
 169 The I.R.S. has stated that the determination of when a partnership beings business is “a question of 
fact that must be determined in each case in light of all the circumstances of the particular case.”  But 
generally, a partnership begins business when it starts operations for the purpose for which it was 
organized, and the “mere signing of a partnership agreement is not alone sufficient to show the beginning 
of business.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.709-2(c).  Obviously, were the signing of the agreement sufficient, the 
partnership would sign this agreement as soon as possible to accelerate the deduction of expenses and 
minimize those expenses that must be capitalized under this section.  
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recognition of gain or loss.170 Further, the elementary principals of partnership taxation 
dictate that the partner’s basis in the property, as well as his holding period, are 
transferred to the partnership and result in an increase in the partner’s basis.171 Likewise, 
if the partner contributes encumbered property to the partnership, he must decrease his 
outside basis in the partnership by the amount of any debt assumed by the partnership.172 
While a real estate investment partnership may not encounter many of the 
partnership tax problems associated with professional service partnership, there are 
situations that are more likely arise with this type of partnership.  First, a real estate 
investment partnership may borrow against contributed property and thus encounter a 
situation where it has nonrecourse liabilities in excess of its basis in the asset.  In that 
situation, sections 752 and 704 would operate together to allocate a portion of the liability 
to the contributing partner, and then allocate the remainder to the partners in accordance 
with their share of partnership profits.173 
The second problem that the partnership may encounter is one where it gives an 
individual a partnership interest in exchange for services rendered.  Generally, a 
partnership should avoid this type of transaction since it results in income for the service 
provider and a resulting “tax cost” basis in the partnership.174 An easy way around this 
 
170 See I.R.C. § 721(a).  The partnership must pay particular attention to special allocations of gain, loss, 
etc, from the contributed property.  In every instance these special allocations must have substantial 
economic effect under § 704(b).  See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2); Orrisch v. Comm’r, 55 T.C. 
395 (1970). 
 171 See I.R.C. §§ 723 and 1223(2).  § 704(c) operates to prevent the pre-contribution gain or loss from 
shifting to other partners. 
 172 I.R.C. § 752(b).  Under § 752(a) the noncontributing partners would record an increase in their 
outside basis in the partnership to the extent that they assume liability for debts contributed by another 
partner.  
 173 See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(3).  
 174 I.R.C. § 1012.  Additionally, this expense may not be immediately deductible; the partnership must 
consider the nature of the service rendered and may have to capitalize the expense.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-
6(a)(4).  See generally, McDougal v. Comm’r, 62 T.C. 720 (1974). 
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problem is to have a valuable service provider buy into the partnership and then pay them 
for services rendered or provide them a guaranteed payment.175 
Yet another problem that may commonly arise for real estate investment 
partnerships is the question of how to account for fees related to the acquisition of real 
estate and financial commitments to acquire property.  Generally, fees incurred in the 
acquisition of real property must be capitalized to the cost of that asset.176 Of particular 
importance for a real estate investment partnership is the requirement that expenses 
related to purchase documents, brokerage fees, and title review must be capitalized;177 
expenses incurred to defend title must be capitalized,178 and the cost of surveys must be 
capitalized,179 but real property taxes are generally deductible when paid or incurred.180 
Also important to the real estate investment partnership is the potential deduction 
associated with searching for and evaluating potential investments.  If a transaction is 
“entered into for profit” the partnership may be permitted an ordinary loss deduction 
 
175 An even simpler solution would be to maintain the employer/employee relationship, but that option is 
not always feasible.  For more on guaranteed payments or payments for services rendered by partners see 
I.R.C. §§ 707(a)(1) and 707(c).  
 176 I.R.C. § 263; see also Surloff v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 210 (1983) (requiring capitalization of legal fees 
incurred to acquire a partnership interest under § 709(b)). 
 177 Millinery Center Bldg. Corp. v. Comm’r, 21 T.C. 817 (1954); and Thompson v. Comm’r, 9 B.T.A. 
1342, 1928 B.T.A. LEXIS 4254 (1928).  
 178 Boagni v. Comm’r, 59 T.C. 708 (1973).  Of particular interest is Godfrey, where the court required 
capitalization of legal fees incurred in an unsuccessful zoning challenge.  Godfrey v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 
1963-1, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, at *21-22 (1963) (I.R.C. § 212 does not apply to capital expenditures).  
 179 Wacker v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1980-324, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 1009, at *51-54 (holding that survey 
costs constitute a capital expenditure within the meaning of § 263). 
 180 I.R.C. § 164(a)(1).  Though contrary to logic, this section does seem to apply to real property held for 
investment purposes, and even extends a deduction to real estate transfer taxes to “dealers or investors in 
real estate.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.164-1; but c.f. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199932056 (May 20, 1999).  Notwithstanding 
this provision, real estate taxes paid or incurred on real property during the construction of improvements 
are capitalized to the cost of the improvement.  See I.R.C. § 266.  Though only tangentially related to the 
present issue, it is interesting that real estate taxes paid by the winning bidder in a foreclosure sale for 
delinquent real estate taxes are not presently deductible under § 164; rather, they are capitalized to the 
asset.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.164-6(b)(2). 
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under § 165.181 Further, the I.R.S. has permitted a loss deduction under § 165(c)(2) for 
evaluation expenses incurred by a business that ultimately decided not to purchase a 
particular property.182 
Finally, once the partnership has acquired land (or has at least found a viable 
opportunity) it is often concerned with issues such as loan costs, commitment fees, and 
interest expenses.183 Ordinarily, the costs of obtaining a loan are not deductible by the 
partnership; rather, they must be amortized over the term of the loan.184 If any portion of 
these expenses remain unamortized at the time the partnership sells the investment 
property they are deductible immediately.185 More immediate deductions, however, may 
be available where the partnership pays interest expenses on loans obtained for 
investment purposes.186 
C. Sale of the Investment and Dissolution of the Partnership 
 At this point every partnership hopes to find itself in a position whereby it is 
tempted to sell the investment property for a substantial gain.  There are many ways in 
which this may be accomplished, and not all of them involve a traditional sale.  In 
addressing the simplest and most common scenario first, consider the consequences to a 
 
181 I.R.C. § 165(c)(2); see Rev. Rul. 79-346, 1979-2 C.B. 84 (Though “expenses incurred in a general 
search for, or preliminary investigation of, a business or investment are personal and not deductible...if a 
taxpayer has gone beyond this point and has focused on a specific acquisition, expenses incurred therefore 
would be capital in nature.  However, if the attempted acquisition fails, the amount that had been 
capitalized would become deductible.”). 
 182 Rev. Rul. 74-104, 1974-1 C.B. 70.  
 183 As previously mentioned, the partnership and lender should take care that the loan is not reclassified 
as an equity investment since this could have harmful and unanticipated consequences.  
 184 Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a); Rev. Rul. 70-360, 1970-2 C.B. 103. 
 185 See S&L Bldg. Corp. v. Comm’r, 19 B.T.A. 788, 1930 B.T.A. LEXIS 2322 (1930) (subsequently 
overruled); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8637058 (Jun. 12, 1986). 
 186 See I.R.C. § 163(d).  Investment interest deductions are limited to “the net investment income of the 
taxpayer for the taxable year,” but if not used immediately the taxpayer may carry the deductions forward 
to future years.  I.R.C. § 163(d)(1)-(2).  
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real estate investment partnership that sells investment property to an unrelated third-
party developer.  There are two ways the partnership may arrange this transaction; it 
could sell the property and then distribute the cash to the partners, or the partners could 
sell their interest in the partnership to the developer.187 
If the partnership chooses to sell the property and then distribute cash to the 
partners in a pro rata liquidation of the partnership, this transaction will fall under 
sections 731, 732 and 735.188 However, if the partners choose to sell their interests in the 
partnership, sections 741-743 apply to the transaction.189 Under § 741 the gain or loss on 
any such sale is capital in nature except to the extent that it accrues from unrealized 
receivables and inventory.190 Thus, this option may present the partnership with a simple 
and attractive alternative to the outright sale of property in jurisdictions where real 
property transfer taxes are exceptionally high.191 
A second option for disposal of the real property involves a like-kind property 
exchange.192 Section 1031 provides for the non-recognition of gain or loss from property 
exchanges when the exchanged property is of a “like kind.”193 Though the election for 
 
187 By transferring the partnership interest instead of the real property the partnership may be able to 
avoid substantial real estate transfer taxes.  See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.  
 188 STEPHEN A. LIND, ET AL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 350 (7th Ed. Foundation Press 
2005).  Since the existence of § 751 property, namely unrealized receivables, is unlikely for a real estate 
investment partnership, this transaction involves a rather straightforward distribution of cash to partners. 
 189 Id. at 249-50.   
 190 I.R.C. § 741.  As previously discussed, the existence of § 751 property is not likely in a real estate 
investment partnership, and so this section does not discuss the conversion of capital gain into ordinary 
gain or loss.  See Glazer v. Comm’r, 44 T.C. 541 (1965) (holding that uncompleted homes constituted 
unrealized receivables and were subject to classification as ordinary income under § 751) for a case that is 
particularly relevant to this analysis.  
 191 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.  The partnership must be certain to have a § 754 
election in place if it intends to take this route; otherwise the purchaser of the partnership interests may be 
stuck with an unadjusted inside basis in the property.  See Lind, supra note 188, at 273-75. 
 192 See I.R.C. § 1031; Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1 et seq.  
 193 “Like kind” property does not include any interest in a partnership.  I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(D).  Nor 
does it include any exchange of real property located in the United States for property located outside of the 
U.S.  I.R.C. § 1031(h)(1).  Interestingly, “like-kind” property may include a transfer of real property in 
exchange for a leasehold of 30 years or more by a non-dealer.  Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c)(2).  
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treatment under this section must be made at the entity level,194 this election provides the 
partnership an opportunity to exchange substantially appreciated investment property for 
other property with appreciation potential while forestalling the recognition of gain and 
thus temporarily avoiding the tax on that gain.195 
Other options available to the partnership include installment sales and sale-
leaseback transactions.  These options are certainly not beneficial to every real estate 
investment partnership and so they are not discussed in great detail here, but a brief 
overview of these transactions may be helpful.  Installment sales, though once 
commonplace, have fallen out of favor to some extent but are still used when a 
partnership sells property to a related entity.196 However, if a partnership engages in such 
a transaction with a related developer it must be careful to avoid recharacterization of the 
installment note as an equity contribution.197 The Code enumerates several factors used 
to determine whether the I.R.S. will classify the installment note as debt or equity; these 
factors include:198 1) the formality of the indebtedness,199 2) the economic realities of the 
transaction,200 and 3) the intent of the parties.201 
194 I.R.C. § 703(b); Demirjian v. Comm’r, 457 F.2d 1 (1972).  
 195 This results because the purchaser takes a basis in the new property equal to the basis in the property 
exchanged.  I.R.C. § 1031(d).  The purchaser should be cognizant of special rules related to the 
identification and transfer of property which are detailed in § 1031(a)(3).  
 196 The developer entity can generally obtain more beneficial financing terms from the related party than 
it could from another lender, but this occasionally leads to reclassification problems.  See I.R.C. § 351.   
 197 Id.; see also § 385(b).  
 198 The 9th Circuit goes beyond this analysis and enumerates eleven factors.  Bauer v. Comm’r, 748 F.2d 
1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1984) (this decision has been cited with approval in nearly every circuit).  
 199 I.R.C. § 385(b)(1)-(2).  The I.R.S. looks at whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay a 
determinable sum on demand, or on a specified date.  The note should also include a reasonable rate of 
interest and should not be subordinate to other indebtedness to any significant extent.  
 200 I.R.C. § 385(b)(3)-(4).  The I.R.S. considers whether the debtor has inadequate capital, the debtor’s 
ability to obtain outside financing, and whether the debt is convertible.  
 201 I.R.C. § 385(b)(5).  The I.R.S. considers the relationship between the parties and whether the 
obligation to pay is contingent.   
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 A sale-leaseback transaction may be beneficial when the partnership finds it 
advantageous to liquidate the investment and then lease the property back so that they 
may develop it or lease it to a third party.202 Again, these transactions may be reclassified 
if suspect.  Generally, the court will choose to classify the transaction either as an actual 
sale,203 a financing transaction,204 or an exchange.205 The ultimate decision is dependent 
upon a large number of factors.    
 
VI. Conclusion 
Real estate investment partnerships, typically organized as an LLC, offer 
tremendous tax benefits by preserving capital gains.  Though numerous pitfalls await the 
unwary investor, the Fifth Circuit’s framework provides attorneys with an excellent guide 
for structuring these transactions to preserve capital gains.  Fortunately, application of the 
Fifth Circuit’s framework is not limited to that jurisdiction,206 and the elements of that 
framework are broad enough to afford investors the freedom to structure these 
transactions in many ways.  The partnership itself, as a flow-through entity, provides the 
flexibility required to make these investments.  Furthermore, the ease of organization, 
though perhaps not the ease of record keeping, makes the partnership and LLC a natural 
choice for real estate investments.  
 
202 This transaction may be used to obtain cash in exchange for the property and will generally yield 
more cash than a bank would be willing to loan against the property.  Thus, the question arises as to 
whether this transaction should be classified as a sale or a loan.  Further, this transaction may secure capital 
gains status for one year when the partnership’s subsequent activity would likely convert the gain to 
ordinary income.   
 203 See generally Leslie Co. v. Comm’r, 64 T.C. 247 (1975), aff’d 539 F.2d 943 (3rd Cir. 1976), nonacq. 
at 1978-2 C.B. 3 (I.R.S. 1978).  
 204 Ill. Power Co. v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1417 (1986), acq. 1990-2 C.B. 1.   
 205 See supra note 193; Rev. Rul. 60-43, 1960-1 C.B. 687. 
 206 Though the framework is binding precedent only in the 5th Circuit, it has been applied in one form or 
another in nearly every U.S. jurisdiction.  
